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NOTES
Liability of Federal Agencies to Garnishment Proceedings
The belief that garnishment of public corporations and agencies was
against public policy gained wide support at an early date in our history.'
It was accorded widespread acceptance because garnishment of the agent
was viewed as an attempt to assert a claim against the United States and
2
that would be a direct violation of the sovereign immunity from suit.
Further, it was thought that a contrary rule would lead to inconvenience,3
delay 4 and even suspension 5 of government business. Even the entrance
of governmental bodies into fields of endeavor long regarded as in the
domain of private business 6 could not stir the judiciary to forsake its
principle of stare decisis in this branch of the law. Made impregnable by
constant repetition,T the law waited upon the action of legislatures for a
change and resulted in statutes in the majority of states to the effect that
garnishment of municipal and of state governments was permissible.' But
even though the general law had been stagnant for a time, there was evident an undercurrent of distaste for the rule which eventually led to a
changing attitude in the law of Federal agencies.
FORMATIVE PERIOD OF THE RULE

Probably the first recorded case of a garnishment proceeding against
the Federal government was Averill v. Tucker,9 decided in 1824, where, in
I. I DILLON, MUNIcIPAL Co1oRATIoNs (5th ed. 1911) 469; Fordham, Garnishment of Public Corporations (933) 39 W. VA. L. Q. 224.
2. "It is not doubted that cases may have arisen in which the government, as a

matter of policy or accommodation, may have aided a creditor of one who received
money for public services; but this cannot have been under any supposed legal liability,
as no such liability attaches to the government, or to its disbursing officers." Buchanan
v. Alexander, 4 How. 20, 21 (U. S. 1846).
"In the last analysis we see nothing but what is, in effect, an effort to assert a
claim against the United States, as the garnishment proceedings, while running against
the officers individually, seek to hold the officers for what they hold officially ..
White v. Wright, 151 Okla. 93, 94, I P. (2d) 668, 669 (1931).
Averill v. Tucker, 2 Fed. Cas. No. 670, at 239 (C. C. D. C. 1824); Fischer v.
Daudistal, 9 Fed. 145 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1881); Hilo Finance & Thrift Co. v. Ahuna,
31 Hawaii 1014 (1931) ; Wilson v. Bank of Louisiana, 5s Ga. 98 (1875) ; Mechanics
& Traders Bank of New Orleans v. Hodge, 3 Rob. 373 (La. 1842); Manwell v.
Grimes, 48 Okla. 72 (1915); Rundle v. Sheetz, 2 Miles 330 (Pa. 1839).
3. "No government is liable to the process of garnishment. Public convenience
requires that it should not be so subject. Its revenues must be collected free from
interruption." Wilson v. Bank of Louisiana, 55 Ga. 98, ioo (1875).
4. ". . . the garnishment proceedings . . . seek to hold the officers for what
they hold officially, and to hold them liable would be to dictate how, when, and in
what manner the governmental duty of the United States should be performed." White
v. Wright, 151 Okla. 93, 94, I P. (2d) 668, 669 (1931).
5. "The funds of the government are specifically appropriated to certain national
objects, and if such appropriations may be diverted and defeated by state process or
otherwise, the functions of the government may be suspended. So long as the money
remains in the hands of a disbursing officer, it is as much the money of the United
States, as if it had not been drawn from the treasury." Buchanan v. Alexander, 4
How. 20 (U. S. 1846).
6. Fordham, supra note I.
7. See cases cited note 2 supra.
8. For a collection of such statutes see Fordham, supra note I, at 224 n. 2. See
also I DILLON, op. cit. supra note I, at 472 n. 2.
9. 2 Fed. Cas. No. 67o, at 239 (C. C. D. C. 1824).
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a dictum, the court remarked that the garnishee "was to be considered as
an agent of the government, and that neither he nor the treasurer of the
United States could be sued . . . and therefore (were) not liable as
garnishees . ..
" 10 The earliest leading decision and the one to which

constant reference has been made was the Supreme Court's holding in
Buchanan v. Alexander." A strong stand was taken against permitting
garnishment, for the court, in its discussion, stated that, "No government
can sanction it. At all times it would be found embarrassing, and under
some circumstances it might be fatal to the public service." 12 For practically the remainder of the century this sentiment was reiterated 13 in a
number of cases which, like Buchanan v. Alexander, dealt with the garnishment of an employee's wages or were analogous thereto. The principle
underlying these decisions was that the money or property which the party
was attempting to garnish was being held by the individual garnished in
his official capacity.' 4 Therefore, his possession amounted to possession
by the United States, 5 a sovereign power with a sovereign's immunity
from suit which was an effective, bar to garnishment proceedings unless
consent were given by the sovereign.' 6

ERA OF WORLD WAR AGENCIES
The first concerted reaction to this rule came with the advent of the
World War I agencies. Numerous attempts were made to garnish these
war-time agencies of the Federal government, namely, the Federal Railroad Administration 17 and the United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation.' 3 The railroad cases 19 were governed by a proclamation of the President which read: "Except with the prior written consent
io. Id. at 241.
I. 4 How. 2o (U. S. 1846).
12.

Ibid.

13. Fischer v. Daudistal, 9 Fed. i45 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1881) ; McCarthy v. U. S.
Shipping Board Mer. Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D. C. 193I); Wilson v.
Bank of Louisiana, 55 Ga. 98 (1875); Hilo Finance & Thrift Co. v. Ahuna, 3 Hawaii 1014 (193); Mechanics & Traders Bank of New Orleans v. Hodge, 3 Rob. 373
(La. 1842); Heuermann v. Heuermann, 237 S. W. 893 (Mo. App. 1922); White v.
Wright, I5i Okla. 93, I P. (2d) 668 (93) ; Manwell v. Grimes, 48 Okla. 72 (915) ;
Raub v. Seaman, 5 Kulp 398 (Pa. 1889); Dickens v. Bransford Realty Co., 14y Tenn.
387, 2io S. W. 644 (1919).
14. . . . as the garnishment proceedings, while running against the officers
individually, seek to hold the officers for what they hold officially . . ." White v.
Wright, 151 Okla. 93, 94, I P. (2d) 668, 669 (i93i). And from the syllabus in
Fischer v. Daudistal, 9 Fed. 145 (C. C. E. D. Pa. I88i) : "A United States collector
of customs cannot, in a foreign attachment proceeding in a state court, be made gar"
nishee with respect to goods of the defendant held for duties. ....
i5. "So long as money remains in the hands of a disbursing officer, it is as much
the money of the United States, as if it had not been drawn from the treasury."
Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20 (U. S. 1846).
"The fund . . . remained at all times under the control of the Federal Government until it was disbursed by the federal agent thereunto authorized." Hilo Finance
& Thrift Co. v. Ahuna, 31 Hawaii ioi4, ioi8 (1931).
"Whatever moneys he had in his possession as Receiver always belonged to the
United States . . . The mere order to pay A. Hodge a certain sum, did not, of itself,
transfer to him any moneys in the hands of the Receiver to an equal amount. It was,
at most, an acknowledgement of his claim on the United States." Mechanics & Traders Bank of New Orleans v. Hodge, 3 Rob. 373, 374 (La. 1842).
16. Wilson v. Bank of Louisiana, 55 Ga. 98 (1875), is an interesting case on
this point. There, the immunity of the Confederate Government was accorded due
respect by a court long after the rebellion was over.
17. 39 STAT. 645 (igi6), io U. S. C. A. § 1361 (1927).
i8.39 STAT. 731 (i9i6), 46 U. S. C. A. §81o (1928).
i9. A rather good Note in 28 A. L. R. 839 (1924), discusses most of the cases
of garnishment arising under the Railroad Administration.
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of said director, no attachment . . . shall be levied on or against any of
the property used by any of said transportation systems in the conduct of
their business as common carriers; but suits may be brought by and
against said carriers and judgments entered as hitherto . . ., 20 To
prevent any interference with the operation of railroads, the courts liberally
construed "property used . . . in the conduct of their business as common carriers" and included therein traffic balances due one railroad from
another as well as property used in the actual transporting of freight and
The courts did, however, uphold the right of litigants to
passengers."
institute actions against the railroads, 22 refusing them only the right to
levy execution on their judgments, 23 this latter restriction being in turn
But the Fleet
limited only to property actually under Federal control .2
Corporation raised a different problem, it being a corporation in which the
United States was the sole shareholder and which was given 25many different
It was held
powers, among which was the power to "sue and be sued".
that the Fleet Corporation also was not subject to garnishment proceedings, 20 at least in so far as the action was instituted against it in its guise
of a corporation engaged in military activities.2 7 At the same time, though,
a motion to quash such proceedings would not be allowed since the proceedings might be against it in a phase of its existence other than as a corporation for military purposes. 2 This tendency away from governmental
immunity was heightened by a Pennsylvania case 29 which disregarded the
factor of governmental ownership of stock 30 and ruled the Fleet Corporation subject to garnishment on the ground that Congress had not expressed a contrary intent.3 ' Although the reason for the decision seems
20. Issued Dec. 26, 1917. The prohibition was emphasized by repetition and
enlargement in a subsequent act. FED. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1918) § 10, p. 762.
22. "Certainly cars, engines,, coal, machinery would all be wholly within the
terms used. Moneys coming in as traffic balances are simply earnings constituting a
revolving fund, and form part of a working or liquid capital. Such a fund is just
as necessary to the successful operation of a railroad as cars, engines, or coal." Dooley
v. Pennsylvania R. R., 25o Fed. i42, 144 (D. Minn. 1918).
22. ". . . it by no means follows that the law authorizes any interference with
the course of judicial procedure between litigants before the time arrives when there
might be attempts to seize . . . property in the temporary possession of the United
." Muir v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 247 Fed. 888, 897 (D. Ky.
States....
1918). Hines v. Minor, 26 Ga. App. 278, 205 S. E. 851 (I92I) ; McGregor v. Great
Northern Ry., 42 N. D. 269, 172 N. W. 841 (I919).
23. Hines v. Minor, 26 Ga. App. 278, io5 S. E. 85I (i92I).
24. United States R. R. Adm. v. Burch, 254 Fed. 140 (E. D. S. C. I918).
25. See Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 44o, 442 (E. D. Pa.
i919) ; Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 94-1oo (I92o), for a dis-

cussion of the various powers granted to the Fleet Corporation. The latter case
contains an excellent exposition of this aspect of the problem.
26. Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 44o (E. D. Pa. i919);
cf. McCarthy v. U. S. Shipping Board Mer. Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D.
C. 193) ; Zink v. Black Star Line, i8 F. (2d) 156 (App. D. C. 1927). The latter
two cases are concerned with the liability of corporations which were incorporated
under provisions almost exactly like those of the Fleet Corporation and are quite
analogous to the problems here presented.
27. Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 44o, 443 (E. D. Pa. igig).
28. Ibid.

Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92 (1920).
30. "True, its stock is all owned by the United States government. That is not
material. When the government wishes to embark in industrial enterprises, it has
been held that it places its money and its sovereign position in the same plane as
any other stockholder buying in the same corporation.... ." Id. at 99.
31. "It is a business corporation, to be treated as such, unless Congress expressly
provides otherwise, which has not been done in the present instance. . . . If it was
the intent of Congress that the Fleet Corporation should be immune from civil process, it would have been very easy to have written it into the act; but nowhere is
29.
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erroneous,32 the case is, together with Commonwealth Finance Corp. v.
Landis, the first absolute break in the vall of governmental immunity.
The latter case arrived at its conclusion of possible amenability to garnishment by making the possibility dependent on whether the corporation's
specific property and assets were being used in its guise of a governmental
agency or that of a private corporation.33 The same type of reasoning
prevailed in the McCarthy case 34 which, though decided much later, embodied much the same facts. That the viewpoint was changing may be
gathered from the admirable summation of the principles by Justice
Learned Hand: ". . . it is in general highly desirable that, in entering
upon industrial and commercial ventures, the governmental agencies used
should, whenever it can fairly be drawn from the statutes, be subject to
the same liabilities and to the same tribunals as other persons or corporations similarly employed." 35
During this period there arose an interesting case 36 which attempted
to lay down an absolutely mechanical test. Although dealing with the
liability of government for a tort, it is nevertheless broad enough in its
language to cover the problems encountered in governmental liability to
garnishment. The test advocated was very simple; if the corporation were
organized under existing laws the courts were justified in presuming the
intent of Congress to be that immunity was to be waived unless an express
reservation were made to the contrary, whereas if the corporation were
created under a special federal charter the presumption was one of immunity unless waived.3 7 Although this test would be extremely easy to
understand and apply, there is no apparent connection between the facts
and the results achieved. Why the accident of under what law the corporation was organized should determine Congress's intent as to immunity
from suit is not explained, which is a troublesome point when that fact
seems quite irrelevant.38 Even though the test must be discarded, the case
such language found, nor can it be reasonably inferred therefrom . . . What was
the intent of Congress when it authorized the creation of the Fleet Corporation if it
was not for the purpose of conducting a business corporation and assuring to those
with whom it dealt that they would have a speedy adjustment of all claims." Id. at ioI.
The court was very careful, however, in pointing out that ". . . the present
attachment does not interfere with the construction of ships, nor does it endanger the
public welfare in the slightest degree, nor is it capable of doing any act that would
jeopardize the interests of the government." Id. at i02.
32. See p. 488 infra. The court's expression at p. 102, that "Courts will not close
their doors to the relief of honest claimants . . ." summarizes the real basis for
dissatisfaction with the rule of governmental immunity.
33. Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 44o, 444 (E. D. Pa. 99ig).
That the test laid down was not easy of application can be gathered from the words
of the court at p. 443, "The foregoing observations indicate the line to be drawn. It
is easy to draw the line, but not so easy to determine when and where it shall be
drawn."
The court also voiced the thought at p. 444 that the "sovereign . . . cannot be
sued without its consent", but that in this case consent may be assumed to have
been given because of the scope of the powers conferred and the duties to be done by
the corporation.

34. 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D. C. i93).
35. Gould Coupler Co. v. U. S. Shipping Board Mer. Fleet Corp., 261 Fed. 716,
718 (S.D. N. Y. I919). Language of the same import may be found in Fordham,
supra note I at 227. "The rapid expansion of governmental activity has made the
assumption of business and civil relations by public corporations a commonplace. The
natural adjustment in the law is the direction of attaching the usual incidents of responsibility to such activities and relations."
36. Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Board, 268
Fed. 575 (S.D. N. Y. 1920).
37. Id. at 586.
38. (1938) 6 Go. WAsn. L. RzV. 381, 384, seems to approve of the test even
though no explanation of it or reason for it is offered.
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is interesting because it concerned itself with the Congressional intent as
to immunity which, as will be seen later,3 9 is all important.
PRESENT-DAY AGENCIES

Our present era of numerous governmental agencies has already witnessed the second upheaval against governmental immunity which has
culminated in a partial reversal of the case law. The first of the "modern"
cases was that of Federal Land Bank v. Priddy 40 in which the Supreme
Court had little trouble in deciding that the Bank was subject to garnishment process. But it was evident that this corporation, functioning for
profit, whose stock was not completely owned by the government, and
which was empowered "to sue and be sued as fully as a natural person", 41
was intended 42 by Congress to be subject to garnishment. 43 Expressly
reserved by the Court, however, was the point of whether a garnishment
which could be shown to directly interfere with any function performed
by the corporation as a federal instrumentality was permissible. 44 Between
this case and those arising under the Railroad Administration 45 range the
more troublesome ones in which administrative corporations were empowered by a bare "sue and be sued" clause. Although this clause is
similar to the one in the charter of the Fleet Corporation, 46 the differences
between the present day situation and the days of the latter are marked.
The most striking is the military purpose of the Fleet Corporation which
was of the utmost importance to the Government, as opposed to the
numerous extra-governmental activities 47 of the present day agencies.
Further, the huge number of such present-day agencies 48 has warranted
at least a reconsideration of the reasons giving rise to the rule of governmental immunity; and the long-lasting depression has afforded an ample
background of support to the view that much social injustice 41 is involved
39. See p. 489 infra.

40. 295 U. S. 229 (935).
4. 39 STAT. 363 (1916), 12 U. S. C. A. §676 (936).
The National Banking
Act, 13 STAT. 1Ol (1864), 12 U. S. C. A. §24 (1936), had the same clause as to
liability to suit, but the provision was expressly amended in I7 STAT. 603 (1873),
12 U. S. C. A. § 91 (1936) to read, "no attachment, injunction, or execution shall
be issued against such association, or its property, before final judgment in any such
suit, action, or proceeding in any State, county, or municipal court." This would
most clearly indicate that the Court was correct in considering the clause indicated
that Congress intended the corporation should be subject to garnishment.
42. That the intent of Congress is the decisive factor may be gathered from the
Court's words in 295 U. S. 231, "Whether federal agencies are subjected to suit and,
if so, the extent to which they are amenable to judicial process, is thus a question
of the congressional intent. . . . If the answer is not made plain by the words of
the statute, it is necessary to ascertain, by examination of the purposes and organization of the federal farm loan system, whether immunity from garnishment is granted
by implication."
43. The factors considered by the Court in ascertaining the Congressional intent
are discussed in the opinion id. at 232-3. See also id. at 236.
44. "In the present case it does not appear that the attachment would directly
interfere with any function performed by petitioner as a federal instrumentality. We
reserve the question whether a different result would be required if such an interference were shown." Id. at 237.
45. These were governed by a Presidential proclamation expressly forbidding
garnishment. Note 20 stpra.
46. 39 STAT. 731 (1916), 46 U. S. C. A. § 81o (1928).

47. Short, An Investigation of the Executive Agencies of the United States Government (1939) 33 Amt. PoL. Sci. REV. 60.
48. For a partial list of such agencies which reaches fbrty in number, look at
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U. S. 381, 390 n. 3 (1939).
49. The government may aid a creditor collect a debt due him but is under no
obligation to do so as witness the language of Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20, 21
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in that rule. It should not be the cause of much surprise to discover
differences of opinion in the decisions regarding garnishment of presentday corporations which, numerically, divide into rather evenly balanced
groups.
For the purpose of this note, instances in which the wages of an
employee are being garnished will be regarded in the same light as garnishment of any other debtor's credit with the government. Although it is
possible to advance the argument that if garnishment of an employee's
wage is permitted his exertions in doing his job will be lessened, 50 the
argument has not received much support in the recent cases. 51 Rather, it
is being displaced by the view that governments will be served better if
they employ responsible persons. 52 This class of cases has split in much
the same manner as the broader group and the reasons underlying the
decisions are the same as in the larger group. 53 A recent development in
aiding creditors has given rise to an interesting class of decisions which
may be discussed briefly without harm. This new device accomplishes
much the same thing as does garnishment and is analogous to the equity
inpersonam order. By it the court is able to command the debtor himself
to pay off his debts in installments, 54 the amount to be paid being within
the discretion of the court. In such a situation, although New York has
ruled you cannot garnish a federal employee's wages,5 5 it nevertheless
holds that an order directing payment is permitted because "after money
is paid by the federal government to its employee it becomes the private
property of the individual and the state has the right to cause it to be
(U. S. 1846) : "It is not doubted that cases may have arisen in which the government,
as a matter of policy or accommodation, may have aided a creditor of one who received money for public services; but this cannot have been under any supposed legal
liability, as no such liability attaches to the government, or to its disbursing officers."
And further: "It follows that the corporation cannot be made subject to attachment
or garnishment in a case involving solely the rights and liabilities of other parties."
McCarthy v. U. S. Shipping Board Mer. Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D. C.
1931). Expression of the contrary view may be found in Haines v. Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 1O2 (i92O), "Courts will not close their doors to the relief
of honest claimants ..
50. "'The considerations which led to this judicial result were in substance the
following: It was apparent that the salary or remuneration incident to a public office,
as a rule, was essential to a decent and comfortable support of the incumbent. If the
officer should be deprived of this support, there would arise a hazard of his being
driven to an inappropriate meanness of living, of his being harassed by the worry
of straitened circumstances, and tempted to engage in unofficial labor, and of the
likelihood of his falling off in that official interest and vigilance which the expectation
of pay keeps alive.'" Crown Oil Co. v. Eitner, 16 N. J. Misc. 330, 332, igg Atl. gol,
902 (C. P. 1938), quoting from, Schwenk v. Wyckoff, 46 N. J. Eq. 56o, 562, 2o Atl.
259, 26o (189o). See also I DILLON, op. cit. supra note I, at 742.
51. Central Market, Inc. v. King, 132 Neb. 380, 272 N. W. 244 (937); Bool
Floral Co. v. Coyne, 158 Misc. 13, 284 N. Y. Supp. 96o (Sup. Ct. 1936); HOLC
v. Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn. 43, IGO S. W. (2d) 238 (1936); McAvoy v. Weber,
198 Wash. 370, 88 P. (2d) 448 (1939); But cf. Crown Oil Co. v. Eitner, 16 N. J.
Misc. 330, 199 Atl. gol (C. P. 1938).
52. "One would think that it was in accordance with public policy to see that
public officers did pay their debts. . . ." Cooper v. Schooley, 26 Ohio App. 313,
315, 159 N. E. 727 (1927). See also I DILLON, op. cit. supra note I, at 743; (1937)
32 ILL. L. REv. 483, 485.
53. See Lichtenstein, Garnishment of Public Employees (1936) 3 U. oF CHI. L.
REv. 291.

54. CoNN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1937) § 846 (d); N. J.Rav. STAT. (937) tit. 2,
c. 26, § 181; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 793.
55. "The judgment debtor is an employee of one of the bureaus of the United
States government and as such his wages or salary do not appear to be subject to
garnishment. . . . There is no contention that this court may make an order directing the Works Progress Administration, or any of its officers or employees, to take
from the wages or salary of the judgment debtor any part thereof and pay it to the
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applied to the payment of a judgment." 56 The apparent heedlessness with
which the courts regarded this inconsistency is quite expressive of their
feelings regarding reasons why the wages of a Federal employee should be
immune from garnishment.
Those cases which do not permit garnishment must rely on the
"purple robes of sovereignty" for their support 17 because writers have
been able to discredit all arguments upholding garnishment 58 except the
impregnable one that a sovereign is above suit. This statement being
necessarily true it follows that the sovereign should not be troubled with
cases which bear no direct relation to its duties or obligations.5 9 Such a
consideration of the problem has led to the approach of whether the agency
in question is public or private in scope.6 0 Although this test has been
advanced by a number of cases, 61 it will not stand analysis. This is because
the Federal government is one of delegated powers and such powers are
necessarily governmental, or public, in nature. 62 Therefore, loose talk of
the courts to the contrary, 63 all functions performed by its instrumentalities
judgment creditor."

Bool Floral Co. v. Coyne, I58 Misc. 13,

14, 284

N. Y. Supp.

96o (Sup. Ct. 1936).

56. Dibner v. Cousminer, i57 Misc. 229, 230, 283 N. Y. Supp. 369, 370 (N. Y.
City Cts. 1935) ; Reeves v. Crowninshield, 274 N. Y. 74, 8 N. E. (2d) 283 (I937) ;
Cross Bay Lumber Co. v. Samoa, I6i Misc. 458, 293 N. Y. Supp. 794 (Sup. Ct.
r936); H. & P. Paint Supply Co. v. Ortloff, i59 Misc. 886, 289 N. Y. Supp. 367
(N. Y. City Ct. 1936); Bool Floral Co. v. Coyne, I58 Misc. 13, 284 N. Y. Supp.
96o (Sup. Ct. 1936). Contra: Manufacturer's Trust Co. v. Ross, 252 App. Div. 292,
299 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Ist Dep't 1937).

New Jersey, although allowing garnishment of state and city employees, refused
relief to a creditor under the same type of statute in Crown Oil Co. v. Eitner, I6
N. J. Misc. 330, I99 Atl. goI (C. P. 1938). For a vigorous but far-fetched criticism
of the latter holding see (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 322.
57. ".

.

.

the corporation is the United States of America, clothed in the royal

purple of sovereignty, and because of this cannot be subjected to any process .
...
Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Landis, 261 Fed. 44o, 442 (E. D. Pa. i919).
58. I DILLON, op. cit. supra note I, at 469; Fordham, supra note i, at 228; Lichtenstein, supra note 53, at 293; (I935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 923, 924; (1935) 20
IowA L. Ray. 85I; (937)
32 Iu. L. REV. 483; (940)
28 GEo. L. J. 1138. See
also Central Market, Inc. v. King, 132 Neb. 380, 272 N. W. 244 (i937) ; H. & P.
Paint Supply Co. v. Ortloff, I59 Misc. 886, 289 N. Y. Supp. 367 (N. Y. City Ct.
1936); Gill v. Reese, 53 Ohio App. 134, 4 N. E. (2d) 273 (1936).
59. "The corporation is financed by the United States, the property operated by
it belongs to the government, and it functions as an instrumentality of the government.
"It follows that the corporation cannot be made subject to attachment or garnishment in a case involving solely the rights and liabilities of other parties." McCarthy v. U. S. Shipping Board Mer. Fleet Corp., 53 F. (2d) 923 (App. D. C. 1931).
6o. Note 33 supra. "We do not think that under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act the government is engaged in a private enterprise or is acting through a private
instrumentality." Works & Rhea v. Shaw, 156 So. 81, 83 (La. App. 1934).
. . . this court has reached the opinion that the Home Owner's Loan Corporation is a distinct and separate entity from the government of the United States,
and has conducted a very extensive loan and mortgage business, which is not an
ordinary function of8 government." Central Market, Inc. v. King, 132 Neb. 380, 389,
272 N. W, 244, 24 (937).
"Great confusion has arisen in the submission of this case to this court on the
proposition whether or not the corporation itself is a public one . . . The authorities are uniform in establishing the law to be that such a corporation is a private
corporation."

Gill v. Reese, 53 Ohio App. 134, 137, 4 N. E. (2d) 273, 274 (1936).

"But it is equally apparent that the corporation was created for the purpose of engaging in business of a purely commercial character such as theretofore had been conducted by private individuals and corporations." McAvoy v. Weber, 198 Wash. 370,
375, 88 P. (2d) 448, 451 (1939). Cf. United States v. Pacific Forwarding Co., Ltd., 8
F. Supp. 647 (W. D. Wash. 1934).

61. Ibid.
62. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 18ig).

63. See note 57 supra.
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must be governmental in nature as opposed to the concept of private functions. Further, the mere fact that Congress has elected the use of the
corporate form for its instrumentality should not disentitle that agency
from immunity.6 4 That fact may be an indicator as to the intent of Congress as regards the suability of this particular working unit of the government, but it should not be entirely controlling. Where the United States
actually owns all the stock of the corporation, this fact should nullify the
worth of "use of the corporate form" as an indicator value.0 5
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

This brings us to the doorstep of the "Congressional intent" theory.
As was pointed out, the various instrumentalities of the Federal government are necessarily engaged in governmental work and should, therefore,
be entitled to the immunity of governments from suit. Although this
principle must be accepted, it must also be taken as true that the government may waive its immunity 6 which is, in that sense, a privilege. Therefore, if the government-garnishee makes no objection to being summoned,
the defendant in the action may not assert immunity for it.67 This approach may be the explanation of the view that once the governmental
purpose has been accomplished by the funds involved, there is no longer
any need to keep them free of the liability to garnishment. 6 That is, the
courts in this instance feel that immunity is waived because there is no
longer any reason to extend it. Unfortunately, cognizance is not taken
of the fact that although the governmental purpose has been accomplished
in the single instance, the opposite should be the result in the long run.6 9
Nevertheless, the approach seems to be the correct one-when has the
government waived its immunity, or, stated conversely, when has the
government consented to suit in the form of garnishment proceedings.
In order to ascertain whether there has been a waiver in general, we
must determine whether Congress had intended, at the time it set up the
corporation or by means of a later act, to waive that unit's immunity from
garnishment. To ascertain this question of fact, the type of work to be
accomplished, the manner of accomplishment, the form of the instrumentality, the elements of control outside the government, and especially
the power of suit and liability to suit, should be considered.70 Since the
64. Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Ry., 259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, I919); H. 0.
L. C. v. Hardie & Caudle, IMI Tenn. 43, 1oo S. W. (2d) 238 (1936).
65. ". . . the United States, in acquiring the stocks and bonds and property
of the Alaska Northern Railway Co., acted in its sovereign capacity, and in exercising entire control, possession, ownership, and management, has merely employed
the corporate organization as an agency through which to execute the purposes of
the statute." Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Ry., 259 Fed. 183, i85 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
66. "No question of the power of Congress to waive the governmental immunity
"
Federal
is present. For there can be no doubt that Congress has full power ...
Housing Administration v. Burr, 6o Sup. Ct. 488, 490 (940).
67. "It is not doubted that cases may have arisen in which the government, as
a matter of policy or accommodation, may have aided a creditor of one who received
money for public services . . ." Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20, 21 (U. S.
1846). Cf. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F. (2d) 195
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929); United States v. Pacific Forwarding Co., Ltd., 8 F. Supp. 647
(W. D. Wash. 1934).
68. ". . . the impounding and compulsory assignment of this check . . . is no
interference with the public interest, for the reason that . . . the governmental agencies' interests therein are at an end." Graves Bros., Inc. v. Lasley, 19o Ark. 251,
255, 78 S. W. (2d) 8io, 812 (i935); cf. Passaic National Bank & Trust Co. v. Eelman, II6 N. J. 279, 183 Atl. 677 (1936).
69. (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 923, 925.
7o. The Court was very careful in its weighing of these various factors in Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229 (1935).
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present tendency, as evidenced by Justice Learned Hand's language in
the Gould Coupler case,"1 has been to attach the same liabilities to government agencies that are attached to private individuals and corporations,
the general provision to "sue and be sued" should be liberally construed.
Especially is this result the more natural one when it is remembered that
in certain of the government corporation's charters the broad "sue and be
sued" clause was amended by a proviso forbidding garnishment or attachment.7 2 Once Congress has authorized an agency to "sue and be sued",
restrictions on that grant should be imposed only when clearly shown to
be so intended. Such was the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Federal Housing Administration v. Burr 71 which reached the
holding of non-immunity from garnishment on the basis of the "Congressional intent" theory.74 Prior to the Burr case, Federal Land Bank v.
Priddy, also a Supreme Court case, was decided squarely on the intent of
Congress as to immunity. Other cases had approached this theory but
few placed their decision on that ground,75 being more certain of other
grounds. However, Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, which will
take a rank beside that of Buchanan v. Alexander as a leading case in this
field of law, has undoubtedly established the "Congressional intent" theory
as the authoritative one in determining liability to garnishment process.,
CONCLUSION

The evolution of a theory has not, however, solved the problems of
the honest creditor. The ancient prohibition of Buchanan v. Alexander,
that monies in the treasury of the United States are not subject to execution because consent was not given by Congress to reach such government
funds still applies to limit execution by the creditor to funds in the actual
control of the agency.7 7 The Supreme Court's words, "The fact that
execution may prove futile is one of the notorious incidents of litigation,
as is the fact that execution is not an indispensable adjunct of judicial
71. Note 35 supra. See also Fordham, supra note i.
72. Federal Crop Insurance Corp., 52 STAT. 72 (938),
7 U. S. C. A. § 15o6 (d)
(939);
Farmer's Home Corp., 50 STAT. 527 (1937), 7 U. S. C. A. § 1014 (f) 3
0I939)73. 6o Sup. Ct. 488 (194o).

74. The clearest expression of this theory is found in the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 231 (1935): ". • . Congress
has full power to determine the extent to which they may be subjected to suit and
judicial process . . . Whether federal agencies are subjected to suit and, if so, the
extent to which they are amenable to judicial process, is thus a question of congressional intent. . . . If the answer is not made plain by the words of the statute, it is
necessary to ascertain, by examination of the purposes and organization of the
(agency), whether immunity from attachment is granted by implication."
75. Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Board, 268
Fed. 575 (S.D. N. Y. 1920); McAvoy v. Weber, 198 Wash. 370, 88 P. (2d) 448
(1939). Cases decided squarely on the intent theory were Manufacturer's Trust Co.
v. Ross, 252 App. Div. 292, 299 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Ist Dep't 1937); H. 0. L. C. v.
Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn. 43, 100 S. W. (2d) 238 (1936).
76. Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 6o Sup. Ct. 488, 491 (1940).

77. "The result is that only those funds which have been paid over to the Federal Housing Administration in accordance with Section i and which are in its possession, severed from Treasury funds and Treasury control, are subject to execution.
Since no consent to reach government funds has been given, execution thereon would
run counter to Buchanan v. Alexander. . . . This restriction on execution may as
a practical matter deprive it of utility, since funds of petitioner appear to be deposited with the Treasurer of the United States and payments and other obligations are
made through the Chief Disbursing Officer of the Treasury. But that is an inherent
limitation, under this statutory scheme, on the legal remedies which Congress has
provided." Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 6o Sup. Ct. 488, 493 (1940).
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process", 7 express the sentiment that although this fact is unfortunate, it
is nevertheless irrelevant as far as this question goes. Further, the right
of garnishment should always be subject to the principle that where an
agency can show it is actually being hindered in the performance of a
governmental function by reason of the garnishment process, such process
should be quashed.79 Therefore, the duties of the creditor are three-fold:
he must establish waiver of immunity from garnishment as respects this
particular agency which is to be found primarily in the statute creating the
agency and secondarily in the factual background surrounding it; he must
find funds within the control of the agency; and he must be able to show,
if needed, that his action is not interfering with any function of the government.
C. C. H.

Rights and Liabilities of a Surety Where the Principal Debtor
Is Bankrupt
Under normal circumstances, the creditor-principal-surety relationships and the respective rights and liabilities entailed thereby are quite
clear. Upon the principal's failure to pay his debt, the creditor may seek
satisfaction from the surety, who, in turn, has a right of reimbursement
from the debtor. The bankruptcy of the debtor interjects numerous questions into the picture. It is the purpose of this note to discuss those relating to the survey's right to file a petition to have the debtor adjudicated
a bankrupt and his right to prove a claim in the latter's estate; and the
effect of the debtor's discharge by the bankruptcy court upon the surety's
right of reimbursement, and upon the surety's liability to and rights
against the creditor. Certain sections of the Bankruptcy Act are of course
pertinent and will be referred to. The present Chandler Act, has made
little change in the previous act 2 in this field.
SURETY's RIGHT TO FILE PETITION AND PRoVE CLAIM

Section 59 b of the Chandler Act a permits three or more creditors
(aggregating sufficient claims) who have "provable claims fixed as to
liability and liquidated as to amount" to file a petition to have their debtor
adjudicated a bankrupt. Where a surety has not been called upon to pay
the debt, it has long been held that he is not a creditor within the meaning
of this section. 4 Not only is the surety's claim unliquidated, it is not
78. Ibid.
79. The type of situation contemplated is presented in the Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Sept. 11, 1939, p. I, col 6, where it was shown how the Federal Housing
Administration could not dispose of local property because title companies had excluded garnishment proceedings from their guaranties of clear title and it could not
touch certain bank deposits because the banks had been served with writs of garnishment. In this way the regional activities of the Administration were effectually curtailed to practically nothing. Compare: ".

.

. it must be clearly shown that certain

types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or consitutional scheme, that an
implied restriction of the general authority is necessary to avoid grave interference
with the performance of a governmental function ..
istration v. Burr, 6o Sup. Ct. 488, 490 (940).

. "

Federal Housing Admin-

C. A. (Supp. 194o).
C. A. (1927).
1940).
D. Pa. I9o2) ; In re Riker, 20
Fed. Cas. No. 11,833 at 795 (S.D. N. Y. 1878) ; cf. Carter v. Lechty, 72 F. (2d) 320
i.
2.
3.
4.

Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 840, 1I U. S.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 STAT. 544, it U. S.
52 STAT. 868 (1938), iI U. S. C. A. 95b (Supp.
Phillips v. Dreher Shoe Co., i12 Fed. 404 (M.

(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) (joint obligors: right to contribution constitutes a provable claim,
enabling joint obligor to be a petitioning creditor).
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provable until the creditor himself fails to prove it by terms of Section
57i, 5 and this contingency can perforce occur only after the debtor has
already been adjudged a bankrupt via a proper petition, laying the ground
for the proving of claims thereafter.
This is not to say, however, that a surety is not a "creditor" against
whom an act of bankruptcy can be committed. It will be seen that a
surety is a creditor where preferences are concerned; I and one who was
a surety at the time of a debtor's fraudulent conveyance, and who paid
the creditor prior to filing, was a proper party to a petition in American
Surety Co. v. Marotta.7 Whether this applies to other acts of bankruptcy
is uncertain when it is remembered that fraudulent conveyances are held
to be subject to attack by contingent creditors, 8 which class embraces sureties. Furthermore, the court in the Marotta case was of the opinion that
the word "creditors" in Section 3a, who are subject to being defrauded
by such conveyances, should be given this normal common law interpretation, which construction necessarily includes sureties within the class
protected against fraudulent conveyances. There appears no sound reason, however, why a surety should not be considered a creditor against
whom all acts of bankruptcy under Section 3a may be committed, since
he is ultimately subject to injury as much as the creditor whom he protects. If this be so, then any surety with a contingent claim at the time
of the debtor's act of bankruptcy whose liability becomes fixed prior to
filing a petition, may be a petitioning creditor under Section 59.
By paying off the creditor in full, a surety may prove that debt in
the creditor's name in the bankrupt principal debtor's estate; 9 failure to
file such proof will effectively bar the surety's claim to reimbursement
against the debtor. 10 Absent payment of the debt, the initiative lies
with the creditor. Should he fail to prove his claim, the surety, under
Section 5 7 i, must prove in the creditor's name to preserve his rights,'"
and a subsequent withdrawal of such a proof by either creditor 1" or
surety " has the same result as a failure to file in the first instance.
Particular emphasis is placed upon the requirement that the filing
be in the name of the creditor, for it is his claim that is being proved, not
the surety's contingent claim. 14 It is the debt owing to the creditor which
makes the claim provable in the first place, and the particular language
of Section 5 7 i prevents the possibility of a double proof of the same claim.
It frequently occurs that a surety guarantees only a portion of an
obligation to a creditor. Thus if a surety for 75 per cent. of a creditor's
5. "Whenever a creditor whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the
individual undertaking of any person fails to prove and file such claim, such person
may do so in the creditor's name and, if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in
part, he shall be subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor." 52 STAT. 866
(1938), 11 U. S. C. A. §931 (Supp. i94o).
6. See infra P. 495.
7. 287 U. S. 513 (1933).
8. Id. at 518. Cf. z GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (Rev.
ed. 1940) § 93d.
9. 52 STAT. 866 (1938), II U. S. C. A. § 931 (Supp. I94O) ; In re Dillon, ioo Fed.

627 (D. Mass. igoo).
IO. 52 STAT. 851 (1938), ii U. S. C. A. § 35 (Supp. i94o) ; Mace v. Wells, 7 How.
272 (U. S. 1849) ; see infra note 27.
ii. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549 (I915);
Johnson v. Fountain, 2oo N. C. 388, 157 S. E. 21 (1931) ; 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
(I3th ed. 1923) 1398.
12. Kilpatrick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 228 Fed. 587 (C. C. A.
5th, I9i6).
13. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jones, 140 Md. 395, 117 Atl. 765 (1922).
14. Insley v. Garside, 121 Fed. 699 (C. C. A. 9th, i903). See 2 COLLIER, Op. Cit.
supra note 12, at i165.
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claim discharges his contingent liability by payment to the creditor, the
claim has actually been split into two parts-25 per cent. still owing to the
creditor, and 75 per cent. owing by way of reimbursement to the surety.
The immediate inference is that each party would file proof of his own
portion of the total claim. It is to be remembered, however, that it is the
original debt owing to the creditor which is provable, not the surety's contingent claim. Furthermore, the basis of Section 57i, allowing a surety
to file in the event that the creditor fails to do so, is the equitable one of
subrogation, which principle never goes into operation until the guaranteed
debt is completely discharged.'" It follows, then, that the surety can acquire no right of subrogation to enable him to prove his claim, and proof
of the entire claim must be made by the creditor,16 who, if he recovers any
dividends over and above the actual amount still owing him, holds the
same in trust for the surety.' 7 Such a construction removes again the
possibility of double proof, for a surety who has completely discharged
his contingent liability may be expected to seek proof of his now liquidated
claim.
Some dissent to the above line of reasoning is to be noted. In Tenant
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,"" a creditor was allowed proof
of a $730,000 claim, upon which S was guarantor up to the amount of
$9o,ooo. An express contract of indemnity provided that the debtor
would place him in funds before he would have to meet any payment on
his bond. After paying the creditor his guaranteed amount, S was also
allowed proof of his total claim of $9oooo. The court was of opinion
that the express indemnity contract gave to the surety larger rights than
those of subrogation and reimbursement, and that for damages for the
breach of this contract, the surety can file his claim. The same result
under similar facts was reached by the New York court, 9 the holding
being that failure of the surety's right of subrogation by reason of the
creditor's filing proof of claim does not bar the surety's remedy against
the debtor, for he can still proceed on his indemnity agreement. Direct
criticism of this result has been expressed, 20 since it affords a possibility
of double proof, and it controverts the subrogation theory of Section 57i.
Furthermore, as will be shown later, the concept of an express indemnity
agreement giving any greater rights to a surety
than those which he
2
normally has is generally considered unsound. '
Taking one further step, where the surety is able to effect a compromise with the creditor, it would seem that the amount actually paid
the creditor by the surety in full satisfaction of the debt should be the
amount provable in the bankrupt's estate, first, because it is the amount
owing to the creditor which is provable, which amount is now by definition reduced; and secondly, because of the desire to improve effectively
22
the financial position of the debtor's estate. The courts so hold.
i5. American Surety Co. of N. Y. v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co., 296 U. S.
133 (935) ; ARANT, SURETYSHIP (193)
359, 360.
i6. In re B. T. Wise Furniture Corp., 3 F. (2d) 271 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924) ; Swarts
v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 117 Fed. i (C. C. A. 8th, 9o2); It re Hanson & Tyler Auto
Co., 286 Fed. 16I (N. D. Iowa 1922); In re Heyman, 95 Fed. 8oo (S. D. N. Y. i8gg);

In re Ellerhorst, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4381 (D. Cal. 1871).
17. Ibid.
i8. 17 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927).
ig. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Carnegie Trust Co., 177 App. Div.
176, 164 N. Y. Supp. 92 (ist Dep't 1917), aff'd, 17 N. E. io86 (97).
2o. In re Miller, io5 F. (2d) 926 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Note (i93I) 31 COL. L.
REv. 1348, 1352, n. 25.
21. See infra p. 497.
22. In re Kent Refining Co., 2o F. Supp. 661 (W. D. Mich. 1937).
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DISCHARGE OF PRINCIPAL DEBTOR AND REIMBURSEMENT OF SURETY

Inherent in the contract of suretyship is the right of the surety to be
reimbursed by the principal debtor in the event the surety is called upon
to pay his obligation.23 Is this right destroyed by the bankruptcy of the
principal? Under Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act,24 a discharge in
bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all "provable debts" and, as has
been seen, 5 Section 57 imakes the surety-secured claim provable by either
the creditor or the surety-in any event, only the one claim is provable.
Hence the principal's discharge is an effective bar to the surety's demand
for reimbursement upon the surety's payment of the debt ;20 and this is
so whether the debt is matured or not at the time of the principal's discharge.27 The surety may assure himself of participation in the bankrupt's estate by enforcing his rights as conferred by Section 57i and
if,from his own lack of diligence, he fails to do so, he can have no cry.
In this connection, certain debts not discharged by express stipulation
in Section 17 must be kept in mind. Thus for example, the surety who
has paid the debt and was neither given nor acquired in any other way
notice of the bankruptcy proceedings, may
pursue his right of reimburse28
ment against the discharged principal.
The surety may attempt further protection by demanding security
from the principal debtor at the outset. Assuming that this collateral is
not attacked in the bankruptcy court, it manifestly cannot confer any additional-rights upon the foresighted surety against his principal. 29 Thus the
giving of a mortgage as collateral protection to the surety cannot confer
upon him the further right to proceed against the principal for a deficiency
judgment in the event that the mortgaged property is insufficient security. 0
He is limited to the proof of the original claim.
But it is doubtful whether such protection can stand up under an
attack on behalf of creditors protected by the surety. In most states,
security given by the principal to his surety for the latter's protection may
be reached by the creditor for payment of his claim, the theory being that
such security is equitably a trust fund in favor of the creditor. 31 The
bankruptcy of the principal debtor of course increases the value of such
fund to the creditor, and in such cases, security given to the surety has
been held by the bankruptcy court to inure to the benefit of the creditors
to whom the surety became bound, and will be so enforced by the court,
again on the trust theory.3 2
23. ARANT, SURETYSHIP (1931) 322.
24. 52 STAT. 85I (1938), II U. S. C. A. §35 (Supp.194o).

25.

See supra p.492.

26. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549 (915);
Mace v. Wells, 7 How. 272 (U. S. 1849) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jones, 140 Md.
395, 117 Atl. 765 (1922) ; Edrington v. Gee, 30 S.W. (2d) 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 193o).
27. See, e.g., Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549
(1915); Mace v. Wells, 7 How. 272 (U. S.1849). Contra: Goding v. Rosenthal, i8o
Mass. 43, 6i N. E. 222 (1901).
28. Dodgen v. McCrea, 225 S. W. 7, (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
29. J.S.Farming Co. v. Brannan, 263 Fed. 891 (C.C.A. 6th, r92o) ; In re Astoroga Paper Co., 234 Fed. 792 (N. D. N. Y. 1916).
30. Ibid.
31. See ARANT, SURETYsHIP (1931) § 8o; L. R. A. I9i6C io62, and copious au-

thority cited therein.

32. In re Pierce, 19 Fed. Cas. No. II,40 (D. Mass. 1874). See In re Jaycox, 13
Fed. Cas. No. 7242 (U. D. N. Y. 1873) passim, for an extended discussion of the entire

problem.

Cf. Glenn, supra note 28, at 588: "The court which is administering the estate
cannot deprive the surety of his collateral, so long as there isa chance that he may be
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Moreover, caution must be exercised to avoid committing an act of
bankruptcy by such a transfer of property, 33 since a surety is a "creditor"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act where preferences are concerned.34 When an insolvent debtor pays a surety, he commits an act of
bankruptcy 33 and hence "surety" is synonymous with "creditor" in this
regard. Likewise, under Section 6ob, where a trustee in bankruptcy may
set aside a preference if the "creditor receiving it or to be benefited
thereby . . . has at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause

to believe that the debtor is insolvent", a surety is deemed a creditor.
Consequently, a preferential transfer, either as collateral or otherwise,
may be recovered from the surety should knowledge of insolvency be
proved.3 6 Where payment is made directly to the creditor instead of to
the surety, the latter is nevertheless benefited since his contingent liability
is thereby discharged. Hence the amount of such preference to the creditor may be recovered from the surety. 37 This of course leaves the parties
where they would normally have been had the surety paid on his contract
to the creditor and would then have been able to prove in the bankrupt
principal's estate.
Instances may arise, however, where a preference given by a debtor
will be of no benefit to the surety and therefore no recovery against him
may be had. Thus, in Page v. Moore,38 defendant was a second indorser
upon a note of a bankrupt who had given the first indorser a preference.
In an action to recover the value of the preference from the defendant, it
was held for the defendant. The preference did not benefit him in any way
since, had he been called upon to pay the note, he could have compelled
the preferred party to reimburse him upon his indorsement, and would
thus have been made whole regardless of the preference.

called upon to pay the creditor. If the nature of the obligation assumed is such that
the principal's bankruptcy . . . terminates the surety's liability, naturally he must
hand over the collateral to the principal's estate; but in all other cases he may retain
it, being accountable to the estate only for the surplus value of it." In situations where
the surety has not paid the creditor, this statement seems questionable in view of the
authority cited in note 32 supra. Authority relied on was In re Federal Biscuit Co.,
214 Fed. 221 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; In re Mercedes Import Co., i66 Fed. 427 (C. C. A.
2d, i9o8) ; and In re O'Donnell, 131 Fed. 15o (D. Mass. 19o4). The point under discussion does not appear to have been presented in the Mercedes Import case, as no
property of the bankrupt was held as collateral by the surety in that case. The Federal Biscuit Co. case involved a situation wherein a bankrupt conveyed property in trust
to secure a surety who had executed an indemnity bond to a bonding company which
in turn had given a bond to secure the discharge of the lien of an attachment granted
within four months of bankruptcy. The only grounds considered for setting aside the

trust were those of a preference or a fraudulent conveyance. The precise point in issue
was the staying of the attachment creditor's suit. Nowhere did there appear an attempt on the part of the creditor who was protected by the surety to reach the collateral held by the surety, which is the issue under discussion. The proceedings were
at the institution of the attachment creditor. The O'Donnell case concerned only the
question of whether the transfer of property to a surety as collateral by an insolvent
debt or was an act of bankruptcy.
33. In re O'Donnell, 131 Fed. 15o (D. Mass. 1904).
34. By "preference" is meant a transfer of property by an insolvent debtor to or
for the benefit of a creditorwithin four months of a petition for bankruptcy, the effect
of which is to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96a (Supp.
1940).

35. United Surety Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 179 Fed. 55 (C. C. A. 8th, igio).
36. See 2 Coulm.R, op. cit. supra note 12, at 1291 et seq., and numerous cases cited
therein.
37. Goldman v. Cohen, 261 Fed. 672 (C. C. A. Ist, I919) ; Kobusch v. Hand, i56
Fed. 66o (C. C. A. 8th, 1907).
38. 179 Fed. 988 (E. D. Pa. i9io).
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Refusal of creditors to surrender any preference received bars such
creditors from proving claims in the bankrupt's estate under Section 57g, 9
and here again a surety is amenable to the statute. Payment by the
surety to a creditor who has already received a preference subrogates the
surety to the creditor's claim cur onere, so that he cannot prove
his claim
40
under Section 57i without a surrender of such preference.
An interesting conflict has arisen from the inclusion of an express
agreement to indemnify the surety in the surety contract, as has been
previously noted. 41 In the Tenant case,4 2 an agreement to place the surety
in funds which it might need before the surety should be required to make
any payment, was held to give to the surety rights beyond those implied
by law. Consequently, the fact that the creditor proved its claim was no
answer to the surety's filing of another claim, since the latter was held
to be for the breach of the indemnity contract rather than for reimbursement under the surety contract. Similarly, it was said in United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Carnegie Trust Co.: 43
"It does not follow, however, because the surety cannot be subrogated to the rights of the bankruptcy creditors, that it has no claim
for the moneys paid on the surety bond. The Carnegie Trust Company gave its indemnity agreement covenanting to make good to the
Surety Company any moneys which that Company should be compelled to pay under its bond. The Surety Company has thus become
the creditor of the Carnegie Company to the extent of the required
payment, and its right to its dividend cannot be impaired by the fact
that the claim arises upon a payment of a deficiency upon another
debt of the Carnegie Company which has already had its full dividends. To hold otherwise would hold nugatory the indemnity agreement. The authorities holding that one debt of a bankrupt cannot
create two liabilities against the estate apply only where a creditor
is thus seeking an undue proportion of the assets of the bankrupt. No
such result can be here reached, and the. surety's claim fiere arises,
as any other claim might arise, out of a contract which itself contemplates the possible inability of the debtor to pay a certain debt
in full." 4

The undesirable result of such decisions is patent. By merely including
an express indemnity clause, the surety is able to recover from the debtor
39. 52 STAT. 866 (1938), 1I U. S. C. A. §93g (Supp. 1940).
4o. Livingstone v. Heineman, 12o Fed. 786 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903) ; Swarts v. Siegel,

117 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 8th,
Conn. 19o2).
4I. See supra p. 493.

1902) ;

In. re Waterbury Furniture Co., 114 Fed. 255 (D.

42. Tenant v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 17 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 3d,
1927).
43. 177 App. Div. 176, 178, 164 N. Y. Supp. 92, 93 (Ist Dep't 1917).
44. Cf. Laughlin, J., dissenting: "By failing to discharge its liability on the bond,
it [surety] has permitted the bankruptcy creditors to recover a dividend on the entire
amount of their claims, undiminished by its liability to them, and it is in a no more

favorable position than if it had claimed by subrogation, and manifestly, on the theory

of subrogation, it would be limited in sharing in that part of the assets remaining.
"If, as appears to be assumed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Smith, equitable principles applied in the administration of the Bankruptcy Law are to govern, then I
think the plaintiff could not prove an independent claim in its own right, and that its
only remedy would lie in proof of the entire claim by the bankruptcy creditors and the
recovery of their proportionate share of the bankrupt estate, holding any surplus over
the balance due them for the surety. . . . The indemnity agreement could not, I
think, change the rule, for it merely expresses a liability for reimbursement which
would have been implied by law." 177 App. Div. at 182, 164 N. Y. Supp. at 96 (Ist
Dep't 1917).
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regardless of any prior recovery by the protected creditor. This means
a double payment on the same claim. At the moment of bankruptcy, the
creditors' claims are frozen. As has been explained, the creditor and his
protecting surety still have between them only the one claim of the creditor to prove in the debtor's assets. This creditor, then, has a certain percentage claim against the total asset estate of the bankrupt, determined
by the excess of the bankrupt's liabilities over his assets. For example,
if the bankrupt's assets equal $i,ooo, and ten creditors claim $2o0 apiece
in his estate, each creditor will receive one-tenth of the bankrupt's estate$IOO, or 5o per cent. of his claim. Now if the surety of a creditor is also
allowed to prove, this will increase the participation in the $i,oOO to eleven
shares; each creditor will now receive only one-eleventh of his claim, or
$90.9 o . Thus is illustrated the injury to the creditors as a whole by the
allowance of a claim by a surety.
Further, it is a general suretyship principle that an express indemnity
provision adds nothing to what is already implied by the surety contract. 45
Hence it is difficult to justify these decisions on either result or logic. In
considering the same problem, the United States Supreme Court reached
the contrary and more desirable result in Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.46 There it was pointed out that the surety had
his opportunity to file proof under Section 57i if the creditor did not, and
the express indemnity clause gives him no further right to recoup. Such
reasoning is certainly more in accord with the spirit of the Bankruptcy
Act in treating all creditors equally and in giving the bankrupt a fresh start
free of all debts.
LIABILITY TO AND RIGHTS AGAINST CREDITORS

By Section I6 of the Act, 47 "The liability of a person who is a codebtor with, or guarantor, or in any manner a surety for, a bankrupt,
shall not be altered by the discharge of such bankrupt." Thus the effect
of the bankruptcy discharge is not to destroy the debt, but only to give
plea in bar, and the creditor may collect in full
the debtor an effective
48
from the surety.

Where a composition agreement under the bankruptcy law is effected
with creditors, a superficial conflict with the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law

49

is to be observed.

That Act, in Section 201, provides that

"A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged. . . . (5)
By the release of the principal debtor unless the holder's right of recourse
against the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved." Upon this authority, the court in Matter of Harry Benedict 10 held an indorser to be
discharged by the bankrupt's composition with his creditors. When confronted with Section 16 of the Bankruptcy Act, the court reasoned that
that statute, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed and that the "discharge" which shall not alter the liability of a surety
under Section 16 does not mean that such liability shall not be altered
by the conduct of the creditor whenever such conduct operates to impair
the rights of the surety; that the active consent of the creditors, being
45. Jenkins v. National Surety Co., 277 U. S. 258 (1928) ; Fouts v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 3o F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; Springfield Nat. Bank v. American
Surety Co. of N. Y., 7 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
46. 236 U. S. 549 (1915).
47. 30 STAT. 550, 11 U. S. C. A. § 34 (1927).

48. See I COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 585, and cases cited therein.
49. See, e. g., 37 CoNs. LAws OF N. Y. ANN. (McKinney, 1917) ; PA. STAT. ANt.,
tit. 56 (Purdon, 1930).
5o. 18 Am. B. Rep. 604 (N. D. N. Y. 19o7).
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necessary to effectuate the discharge, results in a "release" within the
contemplation of the Negotiable Instruments Law. This case is the only
one of its kind found and has been expressly repudiated in In re American
Paper Co., 51 wherein the court pointed out that in a composition under
the Bankruptcy Act, as distinguished from a common law voluntary composition, the discharge of the bankrupt is by operation of law rather than
by the consent of the parties; that consequently, the provisions of Section
i6 should apply.
It has been noted that a surety has the right to step into the shoes of
the creditor and prove the creditor's claim in the event of the latter's
failure to file prooof himself. 52 This subrogation theory extends to those
cases in which the creditor holds collateral in some form, permitting the
surety to be subrogated to those rights of the creditor upon his payment
of the debt. 53 Complete discharge of the guaranteed debt is a condition
precedent to the raising of this equitable right.5 4 Where the surety bond
is less than the amount of the debt, this principle prevents competition
between the surety and the creditor in such security. The problem was
interestingly brought before the Supreme Court in American Surety Co.
v. Westinghouse Electric Mfg. Co.5 5 A building contract with the United
States Government provided that the Government should retain io per
cent. of the contract price after completion, pending acceptance of the
work. There was a surety on the contract for the protection of laborers
and materialmen. The contractor finished the work, but left unsatisfied
claims for certain laborers and materialmen before going into bankruptcy.
The surety's complete discharge of his bond was insufficient to satisfy all
these claims, so that both laborers and materialmen on the one hand, and
the surety on the other claimed the IO per cent. reserve held by the Government, the surety basing its claim upon its right of subrogation. The
creditors prevailed. The surety must be postponed in the distribution
of any assets until all creditors of the class protected by his surety contract are made whole.
This doctrine has been carried to a questionable extreme in Pennsylvania. Hunsberger v Perkiomen National Bank 56 involved a situation
wherein S was an accommodation indorser on two notes held by a creditor, to whom the debtor was also indebted on other notes. The debtor
had pledged stock to the creditor to secure all of these debts, including
those upon which S was indorser. Upon the debtor's bankruptcy, S paid
the creditor in full on his two notes. The creditor then sold the collateral,
which brought more than enough to satisfy all of his claims against the
bankrupt. The surplus realized from this sale was turned over to the
trustee in bankruptcy. S sought to share in this surplus through his
right of subrogation. The lower court had held that S, as surety, was
subrogated, to the extent of his payment, to the rights of the creditor in
the collateral deposited by the debtor, and that the creditor was liable to
him for surrendering the proceeds of the collateral without his consent.
This was reversed on appeal. The Superior Court said that if S had been
an accommodation indorser upon all of the debtor's notes to this creditor,
51. 255 Fed.

121

(D. N. J. igig) ; accord, Easton Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Caminez,

146 App. Div. 436, 131 N. Y. Supp. 157 (2d Dep't 1911).
52. See supra p. 493.

53. Henningsen v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 208 U. S. 404 (19o8);
Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Dutcher, 2o3 Fed. 167 (W. D. Wash. 1913); cf. Matter of Schilling, 251 Fed. 972 (N. D. Ohio 1918).
54. See note 16 supra.
55. 296 U. S. 133 (I935), Note (1936)

56. io8 Pa. Super. 443, 64 Atl. 839

49 HARv. L. Rzv. 941.
47 HARV. L. REv.

(1933)

142.
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then he would have prevailed; but that in order to assert successfully the
doctrine of subrogation in this paritcular situation, it would be necessary
for S to pay all of the bankrupt's indebtedness to the creditor, not only
those debts upon which he was surety. The opinion of the lower court appears the sounder. While it is quite true that where a surety protects
less than the total number of distinct obligations to a particular creditor,
all of which are secured by collateral, he has no right to subrogate until
all of the obligations so secured are discharged, 57 yet there is no reason
for requiring the surety to discharge all of these obligations himself. The
rationale of the rule against subrogation on part payment is for the benefit
of the creditor-he should not be compelled to split his securities and give
up control of any part until he is fully paid.5" So it is immaterial who actually discharges the creditor's claims, as long as they are in fact wholly
satisfied. 59 In the Hunsberger case, the creditor's claims were completely
discharged, leaving a surplus. The surety should have been allowed a right
of subrogation. By paying his obligations, he was placed, by this court,
in a worse position than if he had not paid, since in the latter case, he would
have been discharged to the extent of the release of the collateral.60
It is a familiar principle of suretyship that the refusal by a creditor
of a tender of payment from his debtor operates to discharge a surety
upon the obligation."' What, then, is the effect upon the surety if the
creditor is offered a preference? The acceptance of a payment, in good
faith, by a creditor, is obviously in the best interests of the surety; the
fact that such payment is subject to being set aside by the filing of a petition in bankruptcy within four months is no grounds for a refusal on his
part. If the suspicious creditor, fearing the imminence of bankruptcy,
turns down the tendered payment, and the bankruptcy fails to materialize,
the creditor has lost the protection of his surety. Again, if such tender
is refused, the surety has just grounds for complaint, since his contingent
liability couuld thereby have been discharged. Faced with this dilemma,
the creditor is justified in acting as any normally prudent business man
would under the circumstances, i. e., in accepting the proffered payments.
If, now the debtor is petitioned into bankruptcy within four months of
such payments and subsequently adjudged a bankrupt, this payment is returned to the bankrupt's estate, and what was hoped to have been a discharge of the debt turns out to be no satisfaction at all. Consequently,
the surety should remain liable on the still live debt. This reasoning has
led the great majority of the courts to hold that sureties of an insolvent
debtor are not discharged by the innocent acceptance by their creditor of
required
payment from such insolvent, which the creditor is subsequently
62
to surrender to the debtor's trustee as an illegal preference.
57. Richeson v. Nat. Bank of Mena, 96 Ark. 594, 132 S. W. 913 (I9) ; see Blitz
119 Kan. 76o, 767, 241 Pac. 259, 263 (1925) ; ARANT, SURYSHnIP (1931)

v. Metzger,
360.

58. See Standard Surety & Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 104
F. (2d) 492, 497 (C. C. A. 8th, i939).
59. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. McClintock, 26 F. (2d) 944 (D. Wyo.
1927) ; Shaddix v. Nat. Surety Co., 221 Ala. 268, 128 So. 220 (1930) ; Foos Gas Engine
Co. v. Fairview Land & Cattle Co., i85 S. W. 382 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; Brown v.
Thompson, 99 W. Va. 56, 128 S. E. 309 (1925).
60. See (I931) 47 HARv. L. REv. 142.
6I. ARANT, SuRErYsHIP (1931) 201.
62. Watson v. Poague, 42 Iowa 582 (1876) ; Dundee Nat. Bank v. Strowbridge,
184 N. Y. Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1920); Homer v. First Nat. Bank, 149 Va. 854, 141
S. E. 767 (1928). See Swarts v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 117 Fed. i, 9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902)
for an extended discussion of the problem.
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A negligible minority of cases were misled by a statement of Mr.
Justice Miller in Bartholow v. Bean.63 There, in pure dictum, it was said
that "by receiving the money the holder of the note [creditor] makes himself liable to a judgment for the amount in favor of the bankrupt's assignee,
and loses his right to recover, either of the indorser or of the bankrupt's
estate".6 4 Upon this authority, the federal district court in In Re Ayers "
held that since the creditor thus loses his rights against his surety, the
latter is relieved of liability and has no claim provable in the debtor's
bankruptcy. And the Kentucky supreme court, 6 in a decision relying on
the same source, held a surety to be relieved of liability to the creditor by
the latter's acceptance of a preferential payment from an insolvent debtor,
but limited the rule to situations where the creditor failed to communicate
to the surety the facts of such payment. The reasoning of the majority
courts is sufficient answer to these decisions ;67 there has been no adoption
of such view in recent years.
CONCLUSION

The determination of the status of a surety where his principal is
bankrupt may at first appear confusing and inconsistent, under the terms
of the Bankruptcy Act. It has been seen that in some cases he is considered a creditor within the meaning of the statute. While in others he
is not. The solution depends upon the purpose for which the question is
asked. Thus for the purpose of throwing his debtor into bankruptcy, he
is not a creditor, and is only a conditional creditor for the purpose of
proving a claim in his estate. Yet, as to the principal's discharge in bankruptcy and reimbursement, and as to receipts of preferences, he is deemed
a creditor. Such an analysis of the particular facts of each case dissolves
apparent inconsistancies. In each situation, the results seem to favor the
interests of the bankrupt debtor, as against his surety, which accords with
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Act in attempting financial rehabilitation of
the former.
W.T.L.
Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations in
Pennsylvania
The law of quasi-contractual liability of municipal corporations has
had a rather sporadic development in Pennsylvania as in all other jurisdictions.1 The cases, with few exceptions, have not been decided on fixed
principles and established law; the courts rather have taken into consideration the facts and circumstances of each individual case and have
been governed largely by public policy influences. Although very early
cases denied any contractual liability of the municipal corporation unless
63.
64.
65.
66.

i8 Wall. 635 (U. S. 1873).
Id. at 642.
Fed. Cas. No. 685 (W. D. Wis. 1874).
Northern Bank of Kentucky v. Cooke, 13 Bush. 340 (Ky. 1877).

And see
In re Harpke, 1i6 Fed. 295, 298 (C. C. A. 7th, 19o2).
67. See in particular, Swarts v. Fourth Nat. Bank, H7 Fed. i, 9 et seq. (C. C. A.
8th, 19o2).

i. For a complete discussion of a general view of this problem before the various
state courts, see Tooke, Quasi-ContractualLiability of Municipal Corporations (934)
47 HARv. L. REv. 1143; Knowlton, Quasi Contractual Obligations of Municipal Corporations (1911) 9 MicH. L. REv. 670.

No attempt will be made to differentiate between the various types of municipal
corporations of Pennsylvania. General principles here set forth apply generally, modi-
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under an express contract, 2 it has been definitely established that municipal corporations as well as private corporations and individuals may be
held by implication of law.3 The fundamental principle of quasi-contracts
is that no one should be enriched at the expense of another. 4 A group
of individuals, then, where formed into a corporation, either private or
municipal, should be controlled by this principle just as private individuals are,5 but only so far as its application will not interfere with other
basic principles of desirable public policy.6 Constitutional and statutory
pronouncements of sound public policy affect these municipal corporations
greatly.7 Municipal corporations, being creations of the state, are limited
by it in their powers, primarily for the benefit of their constituents, the
taxpayers.3 The fear that municipal officials may burden the taxpayer
by acts outside the scope of the municipality's functions, was well expressed in the early case of the Appeal of Whelen, in which the court
said, "Any rule or practice which permits municipal officers to transcend
their powers is clearly contrary to public policy and fraught with such
mischievous and injurious effect to the taxpayer of the municipality, that
it should receive judicial condemnation." 9 Throughout the Pennsylvania decisions, then, we must keep constantly in mind that two fundamental principles are opposed: the municipality should be liable where
it benefits at another's expense; and, the rights of the municipal taxpayer
must be protected.
I. LIABILITY FOR SERVICES AND MATERIALS RENDERED.

A clear distinction must be made between the irregular exercise of
the power to contract, and the entire absence of such power. The courts
have not at times sufficiently made this distinction, especially when a
particular contract is called "ultra vires", the latter term being used
interchangeably to mean either of the two concepts.'" Such a distinction aids greatly in formulating rules concerning a municipal corporation's
liability for services and materials it has received under allegedly invalid
contracts."
fled only by the statutes effecting the individual classes of cities, counties, and townships. See Phillips, Legal Position of Local Units of Government in Pennsylvania
(1939) 13 TEMP. L. Q. 466.
2.

Hague v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. 527 (1865); Salsbury v. Philadelphia, 44 Pa.

303 (1863).
3. 2 DI.ON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 793.
4. WOOTINVaR, QuAsi CONTRACTS (1913) § 3.
5. "Common honesty requires that a municipality or other governmental agency

should not be allowed, any more than a private individual, wholly to repudiate an obli-

gation of which it has deliberately appropriated the benefits, and, in such cases, if the
municipality does not restore the property which it has received, an implied obligation
to make compensatory payment for it arises." Luzerne Township v. Fayette Co., 330
Pa. 247, 253, i9 Atl. 327, 330 (1938).
6. 5 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) §§2091,2092; REESE,

THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIES (1897) § 191.
7. See Tooke, stipra note I, at 1144, 1145.
8. Bloomsburg Land Imp. Co. v. Bloomsburg, 215 Pa. 452, 458, 64 Atl. 602, 605
(19o6) states, "The interests of the taxpayer must always be one of the controlling
features in questions of this kind. Municipal authorities are not always as careful about
the rights of those whom they represent as they should be, and it devolves upon the
courts to carefully guard the welfare and well-being of the community." See also
WOODWARD, QUAsI CONTRACTS (1913) § 161.
9. io8 Pa. 162, 197, 198, i Atl. 88, 91 (1885), quoted with approval in Bloomsburg

Land Imp. Co. v. Bloomsburg, 215 Pa. 452, 455, 64 Atl. 602, 6o4 (i9o6).
Io. Stevens, Doctrhze of Ultra Vires (927) 36 YALE L. J. 297.
ii. This differentiation must be made since contracts made when there is a total lack
of power of a municipal corporation are utterly void and can found no liability on the
corporation, yet contracts invalid because of an irregular exercise of a power may per-
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A. Entire Absence of Power to Contract
A municipal corporation cannot be held upon an implied contract
to pay the reasonable value of property received or services rendered
12
upon an express contract which was totally beyond its power to make.
By fundamental political principles, the municipal corporation is limited
at its very inception so that it can only exercise those powers granted it
by legislative acts of the state. If, then, the municipal corporation may
not expressly contract under certain circumstances, it would seem that
no recovery can be had for benefits allegedly conferred on the municipality, for it lacks the very capacity to accept such benefits. So held
the leading case of Bloomsburg Land Improvement Co. v. Bloomsburg,"
that where the town was without authority to hold land for amusement
purposes, it was not liable upon an implied contract on the ground that it
took possession of the leased property and even received revenue therefrom. The court took judicial notice of a statute authorizing such towns
to acquire lands for parks, passed subsequent to the execution of the
contract sued on, to find the contract clearly without the power of the
town to contract.

In County of Lancaster v. Fulton,1 4 a much earlier

decision, the county commissioner had contracted with the county solicitor
that the latter receive certain percentages of the amounts recovered by
him for the county in actions during and after his term of office. The
court held the contract to be ultra vires-meaning wholly without the
scope of the county's contractual power-and therefore no recovery was
permitted either on an express or implied contract. The court said, "All
such contracts, whether intended to be so or not, are in effect evasive and
subversive of law, contrary to public policy, and therefore void." 1
Constitutional limitations on municipalities have uniformly been rigidly applied. Our courts have consistently adhered to the principle that
contracts increasing debts of a municipal organization beyond the constitutional allowance 16 are illegal and void. 1 7 Recovery upon a quasicontractual claim based on services or material rendered under such an
illegal contract is vigorously denied, for any such judgment itself would
increase the municipal debt, the evil which the constitutional provision
was adopted to prevent. Barnes, J., in Pittsburgh Paving Co. v. Pittsburgh,'5 after expressing this view tersely states, "It would completely
nullify the unequivocal prohibition of the Constitution-adopted at a time
when the evil of debt-ridden municipalities was fresh in the public mindagainst saddling the future with obligations to pay for things the present
desires but cannot legally contract to purchase.
mit a quasi-contractual liability on the corporation.
CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 2092.

.

.

. We cannot too

See 5 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL

12. Note, Quasi Contractual Liability (1932) io N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 64.
13. 215 Pa. 452, 64 At. 602 (i9O6).
14. 128 Pa. 48, 18 Ati. 384 (889).

15. Id. at 61, 18 Atl. at 385.
6. PA. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 8. This section limits the debt which may be incurred
by a borough council without a vote of the people to two percent. of the assessed value
of the taxable property within the borough. See Williams and Nehemkis, Municipal
Improvements as Affected by ConstitutionalDebt Limitations (937) 37 COL. L. REV.
177.

17. Pittsburgh Paving Co. v. Pittsburgh, 332 Pa. 563,
3 A. (2d) 905 (1938);
Ward v. Pittsburgh, 321 Pa. 414, 184 Atl. 240 (1936) ; McAnulty v. Pittsburgh, 284
Pa. 304, 131 Atl. 263 (1925) ; O'Malley v. Olyphant Borough, 198 Pa. 525, 48 Atl. 483

(I9OI). See also Rettinger v. Pittsburgh School Board, 266 Pa. 67,
(1920).

5O9

Atl. 782

18. 332 Pa. 563, 3 A. (2d) 905 (1938) (recovery was permitted but the borough's
debt was computed to come within the constitutional limits).
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strongly repeat that the mandate of the Constitution is not to be destroyed
in this manner." 19

For purely procedural reasons, also, quasi-contractual recovery must
be denied in many of these cases. Where an action is brought on an express contract, which is declared void, there can not be recovery on an
implied contract in fact or in law; our courts have consistently declared
that any such recovery would be diametrically inconsistent under our
form of pleadings and fundamental contract law. 0
B. Irregular Exercise of Power to Contract
Municipal corporations are not only limited in the powers which
they have been granted by the state, but are restricted in the manner in
which they may exercise such powers. As a general rule, where a statute
or municipal charter prescribes a formal mode of making municipal contracts, it must be observed; otherwise they cannot be enforced against
the municipal agency involved. 21 The principle most commonly used
to deny liability, even in quasi-contracts, is that every man is presumed
to know the law and should act in accordance with it.22 Statutes and
municipal charters are matters of public record, and therefore any party
dealing with a municipality is presumed to know all requisites of its power
to contract. If anyone voluntarily contracts with a municipality, then,
they incur the risk that such contracts may not be enforceable if all formal
requirements are not complied with.2 3 A more fundamental reason for
exacting a strict compliance with statutory requirements and denying any
recovery when they have not been met, is that to allow it would be to
nullify the enactment of the legislature.2 4 Further, for the courts to permit the municipalities to become obligated other than in accordance with
legislative dictates, would "expose the public funds to raids of every
conceivable form." 25 The taxpayer must be protected from detrimental
acts of municipal agents within the scope of municipal powers, as energetically as where there is a complete absence of power or authority.
Many Pennsylvania cases have arisen concerning the statutory28
and charter provisions 27 that all municipal contracts must be in writing.
19. Id. at 569, 3 A. (2d) at 9o8.
2o. Luzerne Township v. Fayette Co., 330 Pa. 247, ig

Atl. 327 (1938) ; Nuebling

v. Topton Borough, 323 Pa. 154, 185 Atl. 725 (1936) ; Brick v. Kapner, 31 D. & C. 525
(1938). See also Witten v. Stout, 284 Pa. 410, 131 Atl. 36o (1925).
21. See Luzerne Township v. Fayette Co., 330 Pa. 247, 251, 252, 199 Atl. 327, 330
(1938); Morganstern Electric Co. v. Coraopolis Borough, 326 Pa. 154, 158, 159, 191

Atl. 603, 6o6 (1937) ; Wilkes-Barre Connecting R. R. v. Kingston Borough, 319 Pa.
471, 474, 181 Atl. 564, 565 (1935) ; Foresman v. Gregg Township, 297 Pa. 369, 372, 147
Atl. 64, 67 (1929) ; Harris v. Philadelphia, 283 Pa. 496, 5o3, 129 Atl. 460, 462 (1925) ;
Union Paving Co. v. Philadelphia, 263 Pa. 577, 1O7 Atl. 370 (1919) ; Trevorton Water
Supply Co. v. Zerbe Township, 259 Pa. 31, 37, 38, 1O2 Atl. 328, 329, 330 (917) ; Smart
v. Philadelphia, 205 Pa. 329, 54 Atl. 1025 (1903).

22. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) §§35, 36, i60, discusses and denies the
feasibility of applying this criminal law maxim very extensively in civil actions. See
also KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS (2893) 85 et seq.; CLARK, EQUITY (1937) § 166.
See Pennsyl23. 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 1268.
vania cases cited in note 21 suipra.
24. See Tooke, supra note I,at 1162.

25. Hepburn v. Philadelphia, 149 Pa. 335, 339, 340, 24 Atl. 279, 280 (1892).
26. Section 1802 of the Township Act of June 24, 1931. P. L. 12o6, as amended by
the Act of July 18, 1935, P. L. 1176, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 53,

§ 16934, provides, "All contracts or purchases made by any township, involving the ex-

penditure of over five hundred dollars shall be in writing. . . . Any contract made
in violation of the provisions hereof shall be void. . ....
27. A typical example of the provisions in municipal charters is found in that for
Philadelphia, the one most commonly tested. Act of June 25, 1929, P. L. 581, Art. XX,

504

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Our courts have consistently held that such requirements are mandatory
and cannot be dispensed with even in view of alleged hardship in individual cases.2
The legislative requirement that all municipal contracts
should be in writing is most commonly applied when a contractor seeks
to recover for extra work done on a municipal project. 29 Where there
is an express contract which has been completely performed and paid
for, the court uniformly denys recovery for extra work done.30 Changes
in plans or specifications after the original contract had been executed,
even though done at the direction of the municipal official in direct supervision of this work, and quite necessary to a most effective finish of the
job, is insufficient reason for recovery. 31 Strong public policy is here
involved, for "changes in plan and specification may open a wide door
to many evils, not the least of which are fraud and favoritism." " The
argument that the contractor will suffer hardship if no recovery is granted,
is answered logically by the court stating, "He can protect himself by
proper stipulation in his first written contract from unforeseen increased
expenditures. If he does not do this then, he must and ought to take the
risk. He is not bound to accept a contract from a city any more than
he is forced to make one with an individual." "
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently reiterated these principles in Willis Bancroft, Inc. v. Milcreek ToZWnship, 34 where an action
was brought on a quantum meruit for extra work caused by a change in
plans for a sewerage system. The contractor had been placed at greater
expense than foreseen under the original contract, because labor was not
promptly furnished under the Federal Relief Administration as provided.
The contract contemplated completion within four and one half months,
but it actually took seventeen, during all of which time contractor's machinery was on the project. Recovery was denied by the court stating,
"We have so held upon the principle that an implied contract with the
§ i, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 194o) tit. 53, § 3361, provides, "All contracts relating to city affairs shall be in writing, signed and executed in the name of the
city. . . .
28. Burke v. Allegheny County, 336 Pa. 407, 9 A. (2d) 396 (1939); Willis Bancroft, Inc. v. Millcreek Township, 335 Pa. 529, 6 A. (2d) 916 (1939) ; Nuebling v.
Topton Borough, 323 Pa. 154, 185 At1. 725 (1936); Union Paving Co. v. Philadelphia,
263 Pa. 577, 2O7 Atl. 370 (I919) ; O'Rourke v. Philadelphia, 22x Pa. 79, 6o Atl. 499
(1905) ; Smart v. Philadelphia, 205 Pa. 329, 54 Atl. 1025 (19o3) ; Hepburn v. Philadelphia, 149 Pa. 335, 24 Atl. 279 (1885).
29. 5 McQuILLIN, MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONs (2d ed. 1928) § 2093, and cases cited
therein.
3o. Burke v. Allegheny County, 336 Pa. 407, 9 A. (2d) 396 (1939); Willis Bancroft, Inc. v. Millcreek Township, 335 Pa. 529, 6 A. (2d) 916 (ig3g); Wilkes-Barre
Connecting R. R. v. Kingston Borough, 319 Pa. 471, 181 Atl. 564 (1935); Morgan v.
Johnstown, 3o6 Pa. 456, i6o Atl. 696 (2932) ; Union Paving Co. v. Philadelphia, 263
Pa. 577, 107 Atl. 370 (2929) ; Smith v. Philadelphia, 227 Pa.. 423, 76 Atl. 221 (191o) ;
O'Rourke v. Philadelphia, 211 Pa. 79, 6o Atl. 499 (1905) ; McManus v. Philadelphia,
202 Pa. 632, 51 Atl. 322 (19o2) ; Hague v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. 527 (1865) ; Daugherty
v. Westmoreland Co., 2I West. L. J. 270 (1936).
31. Hague v. Philadelphia, 48 Pa. 527 (1865), is typical of these cases.
32. Id. at 529. The extreme lengths to which contractors have attempted to place
liability on municipalities for extra work done, not in compliance with their original
contract, is exemplified in Smith v. Philadelphia, 227 Pa. 423, 76 Atl. 221 (I9IO),
where contractor Vare desired a supplemental contract for $55o,ooo worth of extra
work included with the original contract worth about $50ooo. The orginal contract
itself complied with statutory and charter requirements for advertising and bidding on
city contracts. The court denied any recovery by permitting a taxpayer's injunction
against the city. See also Wilkes-Barre Connecting R. R. v. Kingston Borough, 319
Pa. 471, I81 Atl. 564 (2935). Note that neither of these cases involve directly quasicontractual liability; but they indicate the trend followed in those cases.
33. McManus v. Philadelphia, 202 Pa. 632, 636, 51 Atl. 322, 323 (1902).
34. 335 Pa. 529, 6 A. (2d) 916 (939).
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municipality is expressly prohibited here by statute. The courts will
not assist any claimant to avoid the mandate of the statute by permitting
a recovery upon a quantum meruit for services rendered or material
furnished." 35

The legislative requirements for open and honest competition in bidding on public contracts have likewise been held mandatory. 36 Substantial public policy would seem to be subserved by a strict interpretation
of this limitation. "The infirmities of human nature, the natural disposition to favor friends, personal and political, and the various motives which
influence public officers to depart from a strict and rigid adherence to the
obligations that rest upon them as representing the public, make it important that they should be held strictly within the limits of the powers conferred upon them." 3 The making of an express contract by a borough
has been held to be a legislative act which can be made only by appropriate
ordinance or resolution with the concurrence of the burgess, the statutory
mode of creating such contracts being mandatory. 8s Contractors further
must inquire of the authority of the particular municipal officer or agent
with whom they negotiate at their peril that liability will be denied if
a mandatory statute provides that another agent has authority in that
field."

These legislative restrictions on the manner in which municipalities
may contract would seem to be proper to prevent maladministration by
the officials of the municipality; but the courts would seem to err in giving
an adverse decision when there is good faith on the part of the contracting
parties, because of a minor irregularity. The determining factor in these
cases might be whether recovery in face of the irregularity in question
would defeat the very purpose of the statute making such a formal requirement for public contracts. Certain formalities prescribed by statutes or
charter have, in view of the inequities of particular cases, been interpreted
not to be mandatory, 40 in order to permit recovery. The signature of a
burgess, customarily required for the validity of any ordinance authorizing
municipal contracts was declared to be purely ministerial and unnecessary
for municipal liability.4 1

The court would not permit the borough to set

up the neglect of its own officer to do his duty as a defense to an action
on a contract, within the scope of its power and carried out in good faith
by the other party. The requirement that contracts should be granted
to the lowest bidder was designated as a discretionary act for a municipality, a common pleas court permitting legal recovery, though the
language of the opinion42is couched in terms of a moral obligation on the
township in such cases.
35. Id. at 536, 6 A. (2d) at gig.
36. Harris v. Philadelphia, 283 Pa. 496, 129 Atl. 46o (925) ; Smith v. Philadelphia, 227 Pa. 423, 76 Atl. 221 (iio) ; Louchheim v. Philadelphia, 218 Pa. IOO, 66 Atl.
See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 Pa. 582, 129 Atl. 635 (1925).
1121 (i9o7).
37. Smith v. Philadelphia, 227 Pa. 423, 431, 76 Atl. 221 (IgIo).
38. Nuebling v. Topton Borough, 323 Pa. 154, 185 Atl. 725 (1936). See also
Wilkes-Barre Connecting R. R. v. Kingston Borough, 319 Pa. 471, 181 Atl. 564 (1935).
39. Willis v. York Co. Dir. of the Poor, 284 Pa. 138, 13o At. 401 (1925) ; 2 DiLLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORArIxNS (5th ed. 1911) § 777. See Harris v. Philadelphia, 283
Pa. 496, 5o8, 129 Atl. 460, 464 (1925); Kreusler v. McKees Rocks School Dist., 256
Pa. 281, 295, I00 Atl. 821, 827 (1917); O'Malley v. Olyphant Borough, 198 Pa. 525,
533, 48 At]. 483, 487 (igor).
40. What constitutes a "mandatory" provision in the statutes varies greatly among
the states, recovery being allowed generally however, only when the formal requirement can be deemed not mandatory but discretionary. See Tooke, .upra note I, at
1161 et seq.

41. Ephrata Water Co. v. Ephrata Borough, x6 Pa. Super. 484 (1934).
42. Mann v. Upper Darby Township, 24 Del. 354 (1934).
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Breach of a mandatory provision of the legislature must be clearly
demonstrated and adequately proved by a municipality to escape liability,
especially where the breach results after an earnest attempt to comply
with the formality and the failure to meet it results from the improper
acts of the municipality itself." This rule is well illustrated by the recent
federal case from a district court in Pennsylvania of American La France
Fire Engine Co. v. Borough of Shenandoah.4 4 A municipal contract was
invalid because its execution was not authorized by ordinance. There
being no showing that there had been any conscious attempt to evade the
municipal debt limitation fixed by the constitution, recovery for the fair
value of supplies provided was granted, since this amount was well within
the reasonably anticipated ability of the municipality to pay out of current revenues.
Where quasi-contractual liability has been definitely denied by our
courts, still recovery has been permitted on two other theories. A firmly
established exception to the rule that no obligation may be incurred by a
municipality, unless by the formal mode prescribed by the legislature, has
been developed in cases where an emergency may be shown.45 Where
prompt action is required to conserve the public safety or health, a parole
contract may be made even where a written contract would otherwise
be required.4 6 Recovery was permitted on notes issued to raise funds for
repair of bridges and roads damaged by extraordinary floods, even though
the constitutional provisions for debt amortization were violated.4 7 Where
materials were furnished for an emergency hospital and thus used by a
city, it was held liable on an implied contract even though the goods were
obtained by a person not authorized to act on behalf of the city. 4s Another fundamental theory adopted to permit recovery where certain formalities are not complied with, is that of ratification. 49 It is well settled
that contracts which are within the scope of the corporate powers but not
authorized by proper action of the municipal corporation may be ratified
by the proper corporate authorities. ° This doctrine must be strictly applied for an illegal or purely "ultra vires" municipal contract, being void,
is not susceptible of validation. 5'
II. LIABILITY FOR MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED

One of the most firmly established fields for quasi-contractual liability of municipal corporations has been recognized by the Pennsylvania
courts in permitting recovery under the common counts for money had
and received. A significant phase of this field is devoted to the liability
for money obtained for invalid municipal securities. These cases, then,
must be classified as involving an irregular exercise of the municipality's
power to contract. Where money has been borrowed by a municipality
and the invalidity of the instruments evidencing such debt is not due to
43. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. Corry, 197 Pa. 41, 46 Atl. 1035 (9oo).
44. 3o F. Supp. 251 (D. C. Pa. 1939).

45. See Tooke, supra note I, at 1163, 1164.
46. Maguire v. Philadelphia, 66 Pa. Super. 3o0 (1917).

47. Potters Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Township, 26o Pa. 1O4, 1O3 At. 605 (1918).
48. Koch v. Oil City, 47 Pa. Super. 248 (911).
49. Mateer v. Swissvale Borough, 335 Pa. 345, 8 A. (2d) 167 (1939).
50. 3 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed.

CORPORATIONS

1911) §385.

(2d ed.

1928)

§ 1358;

I DILLON,

51. Mateer v. Swissvale Borough, 335 Pa. 345, 8 A. (2d) 167 (1939) ; Southmont
Borough v. Upper Yoder Township, 284 Pa. 287, 131 At. 281 (925) ; Rettinger v.
Pittsburgh School Board, 266 Pa. 67, iog Atl. 782 (1920).
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essential lack of power in the corporation, 52 and where the proceeds have
been used for purposes within the general contracting power of the corporation, recovery has been uniformly permitted. In the earliest case,
Borough of Rainsburg v. Fyan,5 3 bonds were issued to provide for the
payment of an existing legal obligation, costs incurred in municipal legal
actions. Certain mandatory provisions of the constitution " and a statute 5- regulating municipal indebtedness were not complied with, especially in regard to repayment of these funds; and therefore the bonds
were held to have been issued without authority and void. Yet, since
the debt was a lawful one, and the money borrowed had been used for the
payment of an existing indebtedness, the borough was liable for the money
and recovery was permitted on a count upon a simple contract for money
loaned.5 1 The higher court affirmed on the opinion of the learned court
below, which indicated that the debt should not be considered unlawful,
since it was primarily but the exchange of one creditor for another, and
any excess on the bond issue is still held in the treasury, and so can be
readily repaid to the bondholder.5 7 - This attitude of the court points out
a vital determinant in these cases. The courts are prone to permit
recovery when the proceeds of the unjust enrichment are available in the
municipal treasury, and a judgment would not directly affect the taxpayer adversely. 58
The leading case in this field is Long v. Lemoyne Borough," where
a judgment note given by a borough council was invalid, because the
resolution authorizing the borrowing of the money and the issuance of
the note had not been presented to the chief burgess for his approval and
signature as required by statute. Recovery was granted on an implied
obligation to pay back this money lent to the municipality in good faith.
The council could have authorized the borrowing, and so the borough
having received at its special instance and request money for its municipal
needs, its implied obligation is to pay its honest debt. The factual situation in Long v. Lemoyne Borough should be distinguished from the nearly
contemporaneous case of First Nat'l Bank v. New Castle,60 which denied
liability. A city treasurer, without the knowledge, consent or approval of
the municipality borrowed money from a bank, placed the same to his
official credit in an account kept by him with the bank. Recovery in the
52. 6 McQuiLLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) § 2509 (3).

53. 127 Pa. 74, 17 Atl. 678 (1889).
54. PA. CoNsT. Art. IX, § IO, stating, "Any county . . . or other municipality
incurring any indebtedness shall, at or before the time of so doing, provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest and also the principal thereof
within thirty years."
55. Act of April 2o, 1874, P. L. 65, §2, clause 2, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.
1940) tit. 53, § 1872, provides, ". . . before issuing any obligation or security for such
debt the principal officer of the municipality shall prepare a statement showing the
actual indebtedness of the district, the amount of last preceding valuation, the amount
of debt to be incurred, the form and date of maturity of the obligations to be issued
therefor, the amount of annual tax levied and assessed to pay the indebtedness, under
oath, and file it in the office of the clerk of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and upon
failure to do so he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Note that this is a penal statute,
but the court interprets its provisions in regard to formalties as mandatory.
56. The procedural difficulties which prohibited quasi-contractual recovery in the
cases cited in note 20 supra, were eliminated in the Rainsburg case by an additional
count on quantum meruit.
57. Borough of Rainsburg v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74, 79, 17 Atl. 678, 68o (r889).
58. See Tooke, supra note I, at 1149.
59. 222 Pa. 311, 71 Atl. 211 (19o8).

6o. 224 Pa. 285, 73 Atl. 331 (19o9).
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lower court had been allowed to the bank on the theory that the money
advanced had gone into the city treasury, which the city should repay. 61
The upper court reversed, stating that the city cannot be under obligation
to repay this money, since the city never intended or attempted to borrow from this bank and even had no knowledge of it until after the defaulting treasurer's death. The municipality could not be held on an obligation totally foreign to it, simply because a city official had used this method
to obtain funds surreptitiously. 62
The tendency of the Pennsylvania courts to continue to allow recovery on the implied promise of municipalities to repay moneys borrowed
by means of invalid and uncollectible notes is indicated in the fairly recent
decision of Ohlinger v. Maidencreek Township.6 3 A taxpayer's bill to
enjoin the township from paying off an indebtedness evidenced by notes
plainly invalid under both statutory and constitutional provisions was
denied. The court reversed the lower court's decree that the bank
repay the amount retained by it in payment of one note, and declared both
notes illegal and void. Both the Rainsburg 64 and Long 65 cases were cited
with such approval as to indicate that quasi-contractual recovery would
have been granted if it had been necessary here. The effect of this decision on stabilizing the Pennsylvania court's view in this regard must be
weighed in light of the vigorous dissent of Justice Maxey.86 His view is
that the constitutional provisions governing the repayment of municipal
security are mandatory and any attempted violation of such provisions
makes the debt utterly void and prohibits recovery under any contractual
theory. He distinguishes this case from those in which our courts have
permitted municipal debts illegally contracted to form the basis of liability; such as by ratification 67 and where by reason of an extraordinary
emergency or condition, current revenues being insufficient to defray certain unusual expenditures, power to borrow the necessary funds is implied. 8
CONCLUSION

It is apparent from the cases discussed that the Pennsylvania law regarding quasi-contractual liability of municipal corporations has been the
result of the counter-play of two important conflicting interests: safeguarding the taxpayer from the costs of inapt municipal contracts, opposed to the inequities of a municipality being enriched at another's expense.
Protection of the municipal taxpayer from inadvertent or mischievous mistakes of corporate officers in contracting has demanded

61. Id. at 289, 73 Atl. at 332.

62. "It is because of the disastrous results that may come to municipalities if they

are held impliedly liable for moneys borrowed by a municipal treasurer, without the
knowledge, consent or approval of the municipality, even if placed to his official credit,
that a recovery cannot be permited in this case." Id. at 291, 73 Ati. at 332.
63. 312 Pa. 289, 167 Atl. 882 (1933).
64. Borough of Rainsburg v. Fyan, 127 Pa. 74, 17 Atl. 678 (I889).
65. Long v. Lemoyne Borough, 222 Pa. 3H, 71 Atl. 211 (1908).
66. Ohlinger v. Maidencreek Township, 312 Pa. 289 et seq., 167 Atl. 882, 886 et
seq. (933).
67. Southmont Borough v. Upper Yoder Township, 284 Pa. 287, 131 AtI. 281
(1925) ; Rettinger v. Pittsburgh School Board, 266 Pa. 67, Iog Ati. 782 (1920).
68. Potters Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Township, 26o Pa. 104, io3 Atl. 6o5 (1918);
Maneval v. Jackson Township, 141 Pa. 426, 21 At. 672 (189i). See also Phila. &
Reading Coal & Iron Co. v. Dir. of Poor of Coal Township, 311 Pa. 236, i66 Atl. 772
(1933).
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a denial of municipal liability in a majority of actions for materials and services rendered. Where a contract is beyond the powers
of the corporation to execute, liability, quasi-contractually as well as on
the express contract, is uniformly denied, for the municipality lacks the
very capacity to accept any benefits therefrom. Where a contract is
within the limits of the municipal power but is not executed according
to all the statutory requirements for municipal contracts, liability will be
denied, if recovery would thwart the legislative purpose of the enactment.
Certain statutory provisions, then, have been interpreted as mandatory
and a condition precedent to liability.
Where a contract is defective because of a minor irregularity in the
exercise of the municipal power, good faith on the part of both contracting parties and a desire for honesty on the municipality's part directs
quasi-contractual recovery for benefits bestowed on the municipality.
The courts then permit recovery when the contractual requirement not
complied with may be deemed to be ministerial in nature. Public policy
strongly demands that the court should not permit a municipality to set
up the neglect of its own officers to an action on a contract, as long as it is
within the scope of the municipality's power.
Liability of the municipalities for moneys had and received is firmly
established, especially where the funds have been obtained for invalid
municipal securities. The dominant factor for recovery seems to be that
the proceeds of the unjust enrichment be available in the municipal treasury so that the taxpayer is not adversely prejudiced.
To offset some of the unfairness in cases where quasi-contractual
liability must be denied by our courts in view of varied precedents, recovery is permitted on two other well-recognized theories. Thus, contracts
which have been executed as the result of emergencies, or those which
may be deemed to have been ratifid by corporate officials, also form the
basis of municipal liability.
R.I. W., Jr.

